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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2013, 3.1 million Americans were victimized by 
smartphone theft, nearly double the total of a year before.2  
The problem is particularly acute in major cities, where 
smartphone theft is now involved in 30 to 40 percent of all 
robberies.3  In San Francisco, smartphones were stolen in 
more than half of total robberies in 2012.4  These thefts cost 
                                                 
1 The authors thank Phil Malone, Professor of Law and Director 
of the Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic at 
Stanford Law School, and Jef Pearlman, Clinical Supervising 
Attorney and Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School, for their 
guidance and helpful comments on this Note.   
2 3.1 Million Smart Phones Were Stolen in 2013, Nearly Double the 
Year Before, CONSUMER REPORTS (April 17, 2014), 
http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/2014/04/m
y-entry-1.html. 
3 H.R. 962 § 1(a), 2014 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
4 Id. § 1(d).   
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consumers approximately $30 billion a year according to 
the FCC,5 and law enforcement officials worry that they 
pose significant public safety costs as well.  This is not 
hard to believe, given that 68% of theft victims would put 
themselves in some degree of danger to recover their 
phone.6  With 1 in 10 device owners now victims,7 the 
shocking growth of smartphone theft and its attendant 
financial and safety costs has created an apparent 
epidemic. 
 But, is this theft problem really unique to 
smartphones?  The increase in stolen smartphones may 
simply reflect the increase in smartphone ownership.  In 
other words, thieves may not specifically plan ahead and 
single out phones to steal.  Other electronic devices such as 
laptops and tablets are also stolen regularly, but 
smartphone theft may occur at a greater rate for a variety 
of reasons: they are smaller, easier to mine data from, 
easier to repurpose post-theft, and people carry them 
around more routinely with less precaution.   
Whether the theft problem is unique to 
smartphones or not, a solution that reduces theft of 
smartphones in particular and electronic devices in general 
is desirable if it is possible.  Perhaps the most obvious 
response is to make stolen phones less valuable.  If thieves 
cannot access owner data or connect phones to cellular or 
Wi-Fi networks, they may be less inclined to risk stealing a 
smartphone.  This is the crux of the leading anti-theft 
proposal.  By mandating implementation of a “kill switch” 
that can remotely disable a phone’s essential features, 
legislatures and public officials hope to disincentivize 
stealing and reverse the theft trend. 
This paper analyzes the potential efficacy of current 
proposals to deter smartphone theft and the broader 
implications they may have.  It surveys arguments of 
                                                 
5 Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065, 113th Cong. § 2(1) 
(2014).  
6 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 
2014), https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/phone-
theft-in-america. 
7 Id. 
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leading stakeholders, examines the relevant literature on 
technological feasibility and consumer behavior, and 
assesses the potential pitfalls and shortcomings in 
implementing a cohesive, effective policy.  Developing a 
sound theft-deterrence policy requires clarity on and a 
better understanding of kill switch technology, other 
potential approaches such as carrier registries, smartphone 
theft psychology, and the mechanics of the smartphone 
black market. This paper represents the first attempt at 
studying and answering these questions.  
 
I. HISTORY OF THE KILL SWITCH DEBATE 
A. A CALL TO MANDATE KILL SWITCHES AND 
SAMSUNG’S RESPONSE 
 The movement to mandate the deployment of a kill 
switch, a technological method to render a stolen 
smartphone and its data unusable, first gained prominence 
in 2012 when smartphone theft began increasing rapidly.  
The Secure Our Smartphones (SOS) campaign, led by New 
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman and San 
Francisco District Attorney George Gascon, gathered 
supporters around the country as it pressured phone 
carriers and manufacturers to introduce a default kill 
switch in new phones.8 
Following this pressure, on July 18, 2013, Samsung 
proposed adding the LoJack security system, including a 
kill switch designed by Absolute Software, to its 
smartphones at an additional cost to consumers.9  The 
LoJack system would work through a desktop app and 
code buried with the phone’s firmware.  However, because 
most smartphones in the U.S. are sold by carriers, 
                                                 
8 Office of the N.Y. Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, 
Secure Our Smartphones (S.O.S.), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/feature/secure-our-smartphones-sos.  
9 Martyn Williams, U.S. Carriers Rejected ‘Kill Switch’ Technology 
Last Year, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 24, 2014 08:42 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9246557/U.S._carri
ers_rejected_39_kill_switch_39_technology_last_year.   
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Samsung needed the carriers’ approval to pre-install 
LoJack on phones.  None of the five major carriers 
agreed.10   
B. CTIA’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES AND RESPONSES 
THERETO 
Carriers and manufacturers, through their 
representative CTIA—The Wireless Association, initially 
denounced the SOS kill switch initiative and instead 
created a collaborative registry aimed at eliminating the 
stolen phones resale market.  Eventually, however, 
intensifying scrutiny prompted the CTIA to modify its 
position.  It recently created the Smartphone Anti-Theft 
Voluntary Commitment, in which signatories declare their 
intent to make kill switch functionality available on all of 
their new phones by July 2015.11  
 But many kill switch advocates argue that this 
voluntary commitment falls short.  Citing the need for 
ubiquity to ward off thieves, consumer rights advocates 
and a handful of state legislatures have pushed for 
mandatory, rather than voluntary, adoption of kill 
switches.  One such bill, California’s S.B. 962, finally 
passed the state senate in May 2014 (and was signed into 
law on August 25, 2014)12 after Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, 
and Google withdrew opposition on the conditions that 
the implementation deadline be pushed back to July 2015 
and tablets be dropped from the bill.  These companies 
already include software on their phones that allows 
owners to lock or erase devices from afar, but they 
generally accord with the CTIA’s position of keeping anti-
                                                 
10 Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New 
York, (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-requests-information-leading-wireless-carriers-
decision-reject-anti. 
11 Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary Commitment, CTIA—THE 
WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, (accessed February 3, 2015), 
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntary-
guidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.   
12 H.R. 962, 2014 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
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theft measures voluntary and up to the discretion of 
consumers. 
 
C. FINDING A WAY FORWARD 
While most interested parties in the debate thus 
appear to endorse a kill switch option, kill switch 
implementation is not failsafe.  The question remains 
whether current statutory kill switch mandate proposals 
“will effectively deter theft without jeopardizing public 
safety, personal privacy, and civil liberties, or causing 
other undesirable consequences.”13  It is entirely possible 
that a kill switch solution could create as many problems 
as it solves. 
 
II. OPINIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS ON KILL SWITCHES 
The debate over curbing smartphone theft has 
engendered a good deal of controversy.  Some legislators 
have unabashedly attacked carriers and manufacturers for 
opposing a public safety law in order to retain profits 
arising from replacement of stolen phones.  The carriers 
and manufacturers respond by arguing that they present 
consumers with a variety of security options, to which a 
mandatory kill switch would only be a costly and 
burdensome addition.  On the sidelines of the debate are a 
number of privacy activists and technologists who worry 
that mandating kill switches may enable the possibility of 
widespread hacking or discourage innovation.  Finally, 
smartphone owners provide insights about feasibility of 
security options with their relative apathy towards anti-
theft measures. 
                                                 
13 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications 
Committee, March 24, 2014, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml? 
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis 
tab, then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And 
Communications”).  
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A. LEGISLATORS AND PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICIALS 
SUPPORT STRONG KILL SWITCHES 
Following the beginning of the Secure Our 
Smartphones campaign, New York Comptroller Thomas 
DiNapoli publicly pressured Google, Microsoft, Apple, 
and Samsung to declare what they were doing to “assure 
public officials that [they are] acting responsibly” in 
response to the rise in smartphone theft or else face 
divestment of nearly $3 billion from the state of New 
York.14  The comments confronted the companies with 
acting “disinterested when it comes to collaborating with 
law enforcement agencies in the effort to develop a 
meaningful technological solution that would effectively 
eliminate the secondary market in which criminal elements 
realize their profits.”15   
Following a decision by the major carriers to reject 
Samsung’s kill switch in late 2013, supporters of a 
mandatory kill switch became even less diplomatic in their 
allegations.  San Francisco District Attorney George 
Gascón accused the carriers of rejecting the Samsung 
solution “so they could continue to make money hand 
over fist on insurance premiums.”16  Insurance and phone 
replacement costs are major components of carrier profits, 
comprising $7.8 billion and $30 billion in revenue, 
respectively, of the $69 billion the industry nets every 
year.17  Captain Jason Cherniss of the San Francisco Police 
                                                 
14 Letters from Thomas P. DiNapoli, Comptroller of the State of 
New York, to Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung (June 11, 
2013), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/features/sos/
SOS-Letters.pdf.   
15 Id. 
16 Paul Wagenseil, Smartphone Kill Switch: What It Is, How it Might 
Work, TOM’S GUIDE (May 14, 2014 9:40AM), 
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/ smartphone-kill-switch-
faq,news-18772.html (internal quotations omitted, quoting 
Gascón).   
17 Rachel Swan, The Life of a Stolen Phone: For the Smartphone 
Industry, Theft is Part of the Business Model, S.F. WEEKLY (April 23, 
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Department says the police have “tried to blow the whistle 
on this for years . . . [while] companies have had the ability 
to prevent for years . . . [and] people have been violently 
robbed - even killed - and millions of dollars have changed 
hands on the black market.”18  Secure Our Smartphones 
leader Eric Schneiderman blasted the carriers for 
“knowingly dismiss[ing] technology that could save 
lives.”19 
B. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY IMPLEMENTATION 
But the carriers (and manufacturers) see kill 
switches as not only technologically uncertain, but also as 
potentially becoming conduits of new problems.  The 
CTIA has expressed concern that ubiquitous kill switches 
would give hackers or other undesired parties the ability 
to disable entire groups of phones, with particular 
susceptibility for “random customers as retaliation by a 
variety of persons or entities.”20  Manufacturers claim that 
they have already made commercially available and 
promoted affordable anti-theft solutions, including 
Apple’s Find My iPhone and Activation Lock and 
Samsung’s Reactivation Lock.  The major carriers of the 
CTIA, though initially rejecting wholesale Samsung’s kill 
switch proposal in 2013, recently agreed to make available 
kill-switch solutions on a consumer-voluntary basis.21  
This voluntary-as-opposed-to-mandatory proposal 
accords with the position of many technologists and 
privacy rights activists who worry that consumers may be 
                                                                                                 
2014), http://www.sfweekly.com/2014-04-23/news/ 
smartphone-theft-apple-at-t-iphone/full/.  
18 Id. 
19 Schneiderman, supra note 10.  
20 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the 
Answer (accessed February 3, 2015), 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer
.pdf.   
21 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Smartphone Anti-Theft 
Voluntary Commitment (accessed February 3, 2015), 
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntary-
guidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.   
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coerced into increased susceptibility to hackers.  Further, 
consumers already have a variety of security tools 
available to them, and legally sanctioning more pathways 
for Big Brother (or Anonymous) to intrude on consumers’ 
ability to communicate is concerning, particularly in light 
of recent crackdowns in Egypt, BART protests, and 
Occupy Wall Street.  In this regard, consumer safety may 
be diminished by an inability to reach emergency services 
or dependent contacts. 
Some technologists also fear that mandatory 
technology may create a barrier to entry for smaller 
innovators in the smartphone industry or even more 
simply create more costs than benefits.  In comments filed 
with the California Senate, the San Jose Silicon Valley 
Chamber of Commerce reminded legislators “to be 
sensitive to the regulatory environment necessary for 
innovation” and asserted that different technology 
mandates in states across the country “could create 
considerable market barriers for innovative manufacturers 
and the consumers they serve, and mandating technology 
is usually a recipe for the creation of an anticompetitive 
and anti-consumer choice environment.”22  
C. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR PROVIDES LITTLE CLARITY ON 
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF A MANDATORY 
KILL SWITCH 
In the midst of this debate, smartphone owners--
perhaps the stakeholders with the most at stake--seem to 
collectively demonstrate the least bit of interest.  Less than 
half of smartphone users secure their phones with a 
homescreen passcode, and among those that do, the most 
popular passcodes are among the simplest: 1111, 0000, and 
                                                 
22 Comments of San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce in 
Senate Floor Analysis, May 7, 2014, California State Senate, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill
_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis Tab, 
then click the link titled “05/07/14 – Senate Floor Analysis). 
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1234.23  Aggregating the passcode with other phone 
security measures such as antivirus software and data 
backup, 34% of smartphone owners take no measures at 
all.24  This seeming indifference may support the notion 
that a mandatory anti-theft solution could produce radical 
effects, but it may also reveal that smartphone users 
simply prefer more straightforward usage with fewer 
security barriers.  Regardless of what it means, interested 
parties on both sides of the table have mobilized consumer 
behavior data to support their positions.  Currently 
proposed kill switch bills in state and federal legislatures, 
for instance, base their rationales in consumer protection. 
III. HOW THE LEGISLATION CONCEIVES OF KILL 
SWITCHES 
 While the various bills25 active in state legislatures 
and Congress differ in how they describe the ideal features 
of kill switches, they all allude to kill switches vaguely as a 
sort of “technological solution.”  The pending federal bill 
goes even further, exempting from the mandate any 
smartphone provider that incorporates technology that 
“accomplishes the functional equivalent of the [defined 
technological] function.”26  By keeping the definition 
broad, the bills enable companies to use technology 
compatible with their business and design strategies, 
hence making it more palatable to comply with the 
mandate.  However, the broad definitional scope also 
reflects a degree of legislative uncertainty on what 
constitutes the most effective functionality. Reflecting this 
point, the five pending and passed bills--California, 
                                                 
23 Corinne Iozzio, Kill Switches Will Save Your Smartphone, 
POPULAR SCIENCE (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/kill-switches-will-
save-your-smartphone.   
24 Stephen Schenck, US Smartphone Thefts Explode, Nearly 
Doubling Since 2012, POCKETNOW (April 18, 2014, 5:18 PM), 
http://pocketnow.com/2014/04/18/smartphone-theft.   
25 See Appendix for excerpts of selected bill text.  
26 Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065, 113th Cong. 
(2014).  
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Minnesota, New York, Illinois, and the federal bill--all 
have important differences. 
 While all of the bills agree that a kill switch must 
involve software or hardware (or a combination of both) 
that can render inoperable the essential features of the 
device to an unauthorized user, they vary in their 
interpretation of “inoperability” and “essential features.”  
The bills generally accord that the kill switch should 
disable voice communications, Internet accessibility, and 
application functionality, but the proposed Illinois and 
federal bills go further to clarify that this must be achieved 
“even if the device is turned off or has the data storage 
medium removed.”27  In this regard, the Illinois and 
federal bills would require a permanent solution that 
prevents re-programmability after the phone is rendered 
inoperable. 
The treatment of data also reveals the bills’ 
different conceptions of kill switch functionality.  The 
California bill, for instance, is silent on the technology’s 
effect on user data, whereas the other bills require the kill 
switch to either lock or disable the stored data.  The 
Minnesota bill requires the kill switch to lock all data, but 
retain future accessibility, while the Illinois bill would 
require permanent removal.  The federal bill splits the 
difference between the two and leaves the option open to 
manufacturers and providers. 
Compliance enforcement also varies from bill to 
bill.  Each bill, aside from Illinois’s, supports a per-phone 
monetary penalty levelled against those who manufacture 
and sell non-conforming phones, while Illinois would 
require violating providers to insure the phones for theft at 
no cost to the customer.  Minnesota’s bill contains 
additional provisions that prevent purchasers of used or 
secondhand phones from buying in cash and requires 
these buyers to keep records of their purchases.   
In total, the current legislative proposals are united 
in calling for a mandate on some sort of technological 
solution that would help consumers render some subset of 
                                                 
27 Id.  See also IL S.B. 3539 (“SIM card or data storage medium 
removed”).    
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key features inoperable on a stolen phone.  The various 
approaches on specifics, from definitional differences to 
dealing with data on a permanent or reversible basis, 
underscores some of the uncertainty on how a kill switch 
could work most effectively.  
IV. TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED WITH IMPLEMENTING 
KILL SWITCHES 
The state and federal kill switch legislation as well 
as the Voluntary Commitment from the CTIA both suffer 
from a dearth of detail about technical specifications and 
how a kill switch would be implemented.  The bills simply 
call for any hardware or software “technological solution” 
that is mandatory and can survive a factory reset.28 
However, a kill switch solution implemented entirely in 
software will likely not work flawlessly, especially if the 
software is implemented at a high level of abstraction—in 
the operating system (OS) or as an app.  
A. KILL SWITCHES IMPLEMENTED IN SOFTWARE 
Software kill switches depend on users running the 
latest OS and software patches necessary to enable the kill 
switch feature to work.  For example, Apple’s Find My 
iPhone29 app and Activation Lock30 feature in iOS 7 were 
designed to function as a kill switch.  Once enabled, 
Activation Lock is designed to make a stolen iPhone 
unusable even if the phone is reset. However, only 85% of 
iPhones ran iOS 7 at the time the first smartphone bills got 
introduced.31  Therefore, there was still a large chance that 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., H.R. 962, 2013 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. § 2(b)(1) (Cal. 
2013). 
29 Apple Computer Inc., Find My iPhone, 
http://www.apple.com/icloud/find-my-iphone.html. 
30 Apple Computer Inc., iCloud: Activation Lock, 
http://support.apple.com/kb/PH13695. 
31 Christian Zibreg, According to Apple, 85 percent of iPhone, iPod 
touch and iPad devices run iOS 7, IDOWNLOADBLOG (Mar. 24, 
2014), http://www.idownloadblog.com/2014/03/24/apple-85-
percent-devices-ios-7.  
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a stolen iPhone either did not run iOS 7 or have the Find 
My iPhone app enabled.  For example, a recent theft victim 
had shut off the Find My iPhone app after reading about 
how it had been abused by a hacker to remote-wipe tech 
writer Mat Honan’s iPhone, iPad, and laptop.32  With the 
large number of smartphone offerings, OSs, and app 
versions on the market today, designing a set of 
reasonably foolproof kill switch apps that have similar 
levels of protection for users across industry platforms will 
require a significant standards-setting initiative and 
frequent communication between smartphone 
manufacturers and carriers on bug fixes, technology 
updates, and software patches. 
California’s kill switch bill and the CTIA’s 
Voluntary Commitment would require any smartphone 
manufactured in the United States for retail sale after July 
1, 2015 to have a kill switch (the latter on a voluntary 
commitment).  However, most users keep their 
smartphone models for two to three years.  Hence, even 
after July 1, 2015, there will be millions of smartphones 
that were purchased previously running older OS versions 
that do not support the kill switch.  Moreover, iPhones 
running iOS 7 (with the kill switch) look almost identical 
to models without it.  Therefore, smartphone thieves will 
likely not be deterred by kill switches for a few years after 
July 1, 2015, and will take the chance that a given 
smartphone does not have a properly functioning kill 
switch.  Even if a stolen iPhone has the kill switch app 
installed and functional, if a user waits too long to run 
Find My iPhone, that can give the thief time to unload the 
device. (The average duration of time from theft to 
recognition of theft is one hour.)33  
                                                 
32 Rob Pegoraro, Will Apple's ‘kill switch’ tamp down iPhone thefts?, 
USA TODAY (May 4, 2014, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2014/05/04
/will-apples-kill-switch-tamp-down-iphone-thefts/8577215. 
33 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 
2014), https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/phone-
theft-in-america. 
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B. SOFTWARE KILL SWITCHES CAN BE BROKEN INTO 
Thieves may also be able to defeat kill switches if 
the user has not installed the latest software security patch. 
For example, Apple recently put out a security fix for a 
vulnerability that allowed a thief to disable Find My 
iPhone on iOS 7 without a password.34  That defense was 
also circumvented in cases where a user did not set a 
screen-unlock passcode.35  
Most recently, hackers have even broken into 
Apple’s Activation Lock installed on the latest iOS 7 with 
all the latest software patches.  The two hackers who call 
themselves doulCi (iCloud, fashioned roughly backwards), 
claimed to have made the workaround “for people who 
have retrieved their lost or stolen iDevice, in an effort to 
recover access to contacts, email, notes, and more.”36  The 
system works by “plugging [an] iPhone or iPad into a 
computer and altering a file inside . . . trick[ing] the device 
into connecting to the hackers’ server instead” and causing 
the phone to unlock.37  Shortly following the release of the 
doulCi hack, pictures on social media appeared 
“show[ing] that thousands of locked iPhones around the 
world [were] bypassed using the tool just [in the first 
day].”38  Most of the tweets thanking the two hackers come 
from outside of the U.S, where stolen smartphones are 
shipped and sold at a premium on the black market.39  For 
                                                 
34 Carly Page, iOS 7 Exploit Disables Find My Iphone Without a 
Password, THE INQUIRER (Feb. 7, 2014, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2327573/ios-7-
exploit-disables-find-my-iphone-without-a-password. 
35 Pegoraro, supra note 32. 
36 Stephanie Mlot, Hackers Breach Apple’s Activation Lock, PC 
MAGAZINE (May 22, 2014, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2458399,00.asp. 
37 Jose Pagliery, Hackers Can ‘Un-Brick’ Stolen iPhones, 
CNNMONEY TECH 30 (May 21, 2014, 1:37 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/21/technology/security/iclou
d-hack/index.html. 
38 Id. 
39 Alex Heath, Apple Too Late to Stop Massive iCloud Breach, 
Hackers Claim, CULT OF MAC (May 21, 2014, 4:46 PM), 
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example, an iPhone 5S that costs $707 in the US costs 
$1,090 in Jordan and $1,196 in Brazil.40  The doulCi hack 
suggests that software kill switches on phones are certainly 
not immune, even from the work of a couple of rogue 
hackers. 
C. REMOTE ACTIVATION OF KILL SWITCHES 
A true software kill switch, as opposed to a simple 
lock-and-wipe app, would require sending a signal to the 
phone over the cellular network or the Internet to “brick” 
the phone by deleting the OS or by sending out a poisoned 
firmware update.  Absent of physical damage to the 
hardware, the phone could still be made functional by 
installing a new OS or by using special tools to fix the 
firmware.41  iPhones, in particular, are “jailbroken” 
routinely, with the smartphone running a knock-off OS.  
Therefore, a purely software-based approach to render a 
smartphone forever nonfunctional is unlikely to work.  
A kill switch implemented in software can also be 
avoided.  A thief would have to shut the smartphone off 
immediately after he steals it, which most experienced 
thieves already do to avoid tracking software.  The thief 
could alternatively place the stolen smartphone into a 
Faraday Bag42 that blocks Wi-Fi, cellular, and GPS signals 
and wait until he reached a location without a cellular 
signal, e.g., a metal shed or basement.  At that point, the 
SIM card can be removed and discarded, the phone can be 
turned on, the data wiped, and the 15-digit International 
                                                                                                 
http://www.cultofmac.com/280189/icloud-hacker-calls-apples-
response-little-late. 
40 Swan, supra note 17. 
41 Jesse Emspak, Why a smartphone ‘kill switch’ won't deter theft, 
MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug 27, 2013, 02:19 AM), 
http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/gadgets-
electronics/stories/why-a-smartphone-kill-switch-wont-deter-
theft. 
42 Kelsey D. Atherton, Hide From GPS With This Signal-Blocking 
Phone Case, POPULAR SCIENCE (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2013-08/how-protect-
yourself-your-phone. 
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Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number changed.43  The 
carrier network, and kill switch that depends on it, would 
be totally ineffective. 
D. KILL SWITCHES EMBEDDED IN HARDWARE 
 Samsung proposed a more permanent solution, the 
Absolute LoJack kill switch,44 to carriers in 2013, but the 
carriers rejected the proposal.  The Absolute LoJack 
method embeds the kill switch in the smartphone’s BIOS 
(firmware) that can withstand a factory reset and wiping 
or replacing the hard drive.  However, hacker websites45 
offer instructions for computer-savvy hackers on how to 
edit a smartphone’s BIOS to disable LoJack.  Hence, a truly 
tamper-proof kill switch would have to be either 
embedded in read-only memory (ROM) or built into the 
integrated circuits (ICs) on the motherboard itself.  The 
logic on an IC could be programmed to (1) cause the IC to 
malfunction; (2) reset the memories; or (3) destroy the IC 
by creating a short in the circuit.  Because the kill switch 
would be within the IC, detecting it and disabling it would 
be near impossible.46  In addition, the kill switch would 
have to be embedded on every motherboard manufactured 
so that if a thief tried to replace the motherboard on a 
smartphone, the new replacement motherboard would 
also have the kill switch.  At this point, working around 
the kill switch would still be possible for the thief.  
                                                 
43 Emspak, supra note 41. 
44 Absolute Persistent Security Software. The Only Solution That Can 
Survive a Factory Reset, ABSOLUTE SOFTWARE, 
http://lojack.absolute.com/en/persistent (last visited May 30, 
2014). 
45 See, e.g., How to Remove Computrace LoJack, FREAKY ACRES, 
http://www.freakyacres.com/remove_computrace_lojack (last 
visited May 30, 2014). 
46 Email from Mark Tehranipoor, Charles H. Knapp Associate 
Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of 
Connecticut, to authors (May 30, 2014, 11:06 AM) (on file with 
authors). 
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However, because a new motherboard costs upwards of 
$100,47 it might serve as a sufficient deterrence to theft. 
E. HARDWARE REDESIGNS THAT COULD WORK 
Modern electronic devices, such as smartphones, 
have sleep states that are in between fully on and fully off.  
In sleep mode, some circuits on the smartphone are 
powered up and others are powered down.48  “These 
modes often allow the device to wake up autonomously if 
certain conditions are met, such as pressing a certain key 
or even receiving certain data over the Internet. . . .”49  
Therefore, a kill switch that could be activated to wake up 
and “brick” the smartphone even when the smartphone 
were switched off by a thief would be useful.  In addition, 
a hardware redesign to thwart thieves that remove the 
smartphone battery to evade tracking could be to insert 
secondary power sources within the apparatus.  “Some 
phones [already] use an additional battery for memory 
management; it’s unclear whether this battery could be 
used by logging and/or tracking systems. . . .”50  Such a 
secret secondary power source could be used to power 
tracking apps and the kill switch. 
F. FOOLPROOF BUT EXPENSIVE SOLUTIONS 
Militaries around the world have designed “remote 
shut-down” solutions on defense systems since at least 
2008 to disable ICs on equipment that might fall into 
hostile hands.  These generally consist of kill switches or 
                                                 
47 iPhone 5 Replacement Motherboards, EBAY, 
http://www.ebay.com (search “iphone 5 replacement 
motherboard”) (last visited May 30, 2014). 
48 Heather Murphy, Why Snowden Asked Visitors in Hong Kong to 
Refrigerate Their Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2013, 9:41 AM), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/why-snowdens-
visitors-put-their-phones-in-the-fridge/?_r=0&pagewanted=all 
(quoting Seth Schoen, Senior Staff Technologist, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation).     
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
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backdoors.  A military-style kill switch manipulates the 
system’s software or hardware to cause the system to die 
outright, for example, to shut off an F-35’s missile-
launching electronics.51  A backdoor, on the other hand, 
lets the designer gain access to the system to disable or 
enable a specific function.  Because a backdoor does not 
shut down the entire system, hostile users remain unaware 
of the intrusion.  For example, a designer could use it to 
bypass battlefield radio encryption. Similarly, smartphone 
manufacturers or carriers could use a backdoor to continue 
tracking a thief while blocking access to the owner’s 
sensitive data.  However, military-style designs, while 
foolproof, would likely prove too expensive for 
commercial smartphones unless breakthroughs in 
technology and design occur. 
Boeing recently filed documents with the FCC to 
build a tamper-proof android smartphone it calls the 
“Black” phone.  The “Black phone will be sold primarily to 
government agencies and companies . . . related to defense 
and homeland security,” says a letter accompanying the 
filing.52  There are no serviceable parts on Boeing’s Black 
phone and any attempted servicing or replacing of parts 
would destroy the product.  The phone is sealed with 
epoxy around the casing and with screws, the heads of 
which are covered with tamper proof covering to identify 
attempted disassembly.  While such a device would 
provide high security indeed, the need for commercial 
devices to be serviced or repaired likely precludes a 
specialized solution like Boeing’s for commercial 
                                                 
51 Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 1, 
2008, 7:57 PM), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for-
the-kill-switch. 
52 Letter from Bruce A. Olcott, The Boeing Company, Supplemented 
Request for Confidential Treatment  
 FCC Identification Number H8V-BLK1 (Model: BLACK), to Joe 
Dichoso, Chief Equipment Authorization Branch, Office of 
Engineering and Technology, Federal Communications 
Commission, 
https://apps.fcc.gov/eas/GetApplicationAttachment.html?id=2
202965. 
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smartphones.  In addition, Boeing will not provide 
technical and operational information about the product to 
the general public for security purposes.53  Technical 
information distributed at trade shows will be protected 
by non-disclosure agreements.  With the proliferation of 
hacker sites instructing the public on jailbreaking 
smartphones and evading kill switches, commercial 
smartphone companies might soon decide to follow this 
route in the future. 
Finally, researchers at Rice University and the 
University of California, Los Angeles recently invented a 
new method to protect integrated circuits (IC) against 
piracy.  The new method exploits the inherent variability 
in modern IC manufacturing to create a unique identifier 
for each IC and integrate the identifier into the IC’s 
functionality.54  However, while this novel method solves 
the IMEI erasing problem and is attack-resilient, it would 
likely lead to a large overhead cost for smartphone 
manufacturers and would be difficult to standardize across 
smartphone platforms. 
V. NON-KILL-SWITCH SOLUTION: CARRIER REGISTRIES 
AND MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT 
A. CARRIER REGISTRY OPERATION 
Seeking to deflect legislation that would mandate 
kill switches for all smartphones, and seeking to avoid 
dealing with the technical challenges enumerated above, 
U.S. carriers implemented databases in November 2013 
that use unique GSM and LTE (advanced GSM) 
smartphone ID numbers to prevent stolen smartphones 
from being re-activated on GSM or LTE networks in the 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Yousra Alkabani, et al., Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy 
Prevention and Digital Rights Management, Proceedings of the Int’l 
Conference on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits 
and Systems 674-77 (2007), 
http://www.cs.ucla.edu/~miodrag/papers/Alkabani_ICCAD_
2007.pdf. 
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U.S. and on appropriate international LTE networks.55  At 
present in the U.S., consumers that lose their smartphones 
may call their service provider and have service 
suspended to the smartphone.56  However, it is the 
consumer’s responsibility to know the device’s make, 
model number, serial number, and unique device 
identification number (either the International Mobile 
Equipment Identifier (IMEI) or the Mobile Equipment 
Identifier (MEID) number).57  Different smartphone 
models and carriers may use GSM networks, CDMA 
networks, LTE networks, or a mix of the three.58  
Therefore, a stolen smartphone that is blocked on one 
registry could be activated on a registry using a different 
network standard.  
Additionally, consulting the registries and blocking 
activation of phones reported as stolen is a voluntary action 
of carriers.59  Remote phone location, locking, and data-
wiping services depend entirely on whether the 
manufacturer and carrier provides them on the particular 
smartphone model; the features are not uniformly offered 
on all models or by all carriers.60   Manufacturer or third-
                                                 
55 Letter from Brian M. Josef, CTIA Stolen Smartphones Status 
Update, to Kris Monteith, Acting Bureau Chief, Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal Communications 
Commission, http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-
source/default-document-library/july-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
56 FCC, How to Report a Lost or Stolen Smart Device, 
http://www.fcc.gov/stolen-phones-contact-numbers. 
57 FCC, Protect Your Mobile Device, 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/stolen-and-lost-wireless-devices. 
58 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), 
Mobile Communications, http://www.etsi.org/technologies-
clusters/technologies/mobile. 
59 Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov't rep says next two iPhones were 
designed under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (April 01, 2013, 12:03 
PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govt-
rep-says-next-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.   
60 See e.g., AT&T, Replace your lost or stolen device and suspend 
service, 
http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=52993&cv=820&_
requestid=1370759#fbid=COrGqYlcbAL. 
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party apps available for some models today can locate a 
stolen device from a computer, lock the device to restrict 
access, wipe sensitive data from the device, and make the 
device emit a loud sound (“scream”) to help the police 
locate it.  However, carriers and manufacturers are not 
required to make such apps available on all phones or on 
all networks.61  
Once service is suspended on the smartphone, the 
consumer cannot wipe or lock it. Monthly plan charges 
continue while service is suspended, and the consumer 
must have bought insurance ahead of time to get the 
smartphone replaced.62 
B. AUSTRALIA’S REGISTRY PROGRAM HAS PRODUCED 
RELATIVE SUCCESS 
Australia implemented an IMEI blocking program 
a decade ago and has deemed it successful at deterring 
theft with “net blocking activity [falling] by nearly 25% 
from 169,000 mobile handsets blocked to 127,750 [from 
2004-2011] . . . against the background of an 80% increase 
in the number of mobile services in operation over this 
period.”63  The IMEI is an integral phone “fingerprint” that 
is transmitted whenever the phone is used.  Supporters of 
an IMEI system claim that it may prove more failsafe than 
mandatory kill switches.  Speaking with American media, 
Randal Markey of the Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association highlighted the ease of 
implementing and operating a shared database, which just 
requires collaboration amongst carriers, and the relative 
                                                 
61 Supra note 57.  
62 Id.   
63 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Australian 
Anti-Theft Mobile Phone Technology Highlighted on U.S. Television 
(accessed May 21, 2014), 
http://www.amta.org.au/articles/Australian.anti-
theft.mobile.phone.technology.highlighted.on.US.television 
(additionally noting that “[t]he net blocking figures are derived 
from subtracting unblocking requests (if the handset is 
subsequently found and returned to its legal owner) from 
blocking requests”). 
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difficulty for unsophisticated thieves to wipe the IMEI 
number.64   
C. PROBLEMS WITH A REGISTRY SOLUTION 
However, there are a number of problems plaguing 
voluntary carrier registries.  Many consumers do not know 
about them and do not report stolen phones.  Many stores 
or fly-by-night operations “will jailbreak a stolen phone 
‘no questions asked,’ and thieves can then re-activate the 
smartphone with a smaller carrier that is not participating 
in the registry.”65  Carrier registries may thus simply 
encourage more black market workarounds.  Moreover, 
the registries mainly apply in the U.S. and Europe and 
could encourage thieves to ship stolen phones to other 
areas, where they are more valuable because of export 
restrictions and tariffs.  Additionally, any projected effect 
of IMEI blocking on theft depends on the assumption that 
thieves require cell service at all, not just in the registry-
covered areas like the U.S. and Europe.  Deterrence of an 
IMEI system may fail to prevent thieves who simply wish 
to profit off of hardware resales, user data mining, or use 
of other smartphone functions (digital music, camera, etc.).  
A hack-proof mechanism to track and shut down stolen 
devices anywhere in the world, regardless of which carrier 
is used and without burdening the consumer with the 
responsibility of purchasing and downloading apps (or 
                                                 
64 C.W. Nevius, An Easy Way to Curb Smart Phone Thieves, S.F. 
GATE (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/nevius/article/An-easy-way-
to-curb-smart-phone-thieves-2344797.php.  
65 Josh Harkinson, For Apple and the Phone Companies, "All a Theft 
Means Is Another Sale," MOTHER JONES (Mar. 18, 2013 8:58 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/03/stolen-iphone-
theft-imsi (describing San Francisco District Attorney George 
Gascón’s views on mobile device makers and carriers doing little 
to fix the problem).   
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remembering the smartphone’s 15-digit IMEI number), 
would likely be a stronger deterrent to smartphone theft.66 
D. MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT 
Growing employee demand for bringing their 
personal smartphones to work has driven security-minded 
employers to use Mobile Data Management (MDM) 
services provided by third-party vendors.  MDM provides 
increased security for both the devices and the enterprise 
they connect to by controlling and protecting the data and 
configuration settings for all mobile devices in the 
network.67  MDM solutions can control the apps installed 
or available on an employee’s personal smartphone and 
disable the camera when on company premises.  In 
addition, MDM software can lock and wipe a lost or stolen 
smartphone, display a message on its screen, and cause it 
to emit a high-volume sound.  Other options include a 
wireless or Bluetooth tether that ties a smartphone to a key 
fob and locks or wipes the smartphone if it is separated 
from the key fob by a maximum specified distance.68  
However, MDM solutions do not prevent theft; they 
merely secure data in the event of theft. 
VI. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION’S 
RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AT DETERRING THEFT 
 In theory, implementing a default kill switch in 
every smartphone is seen as the ideal deterrent to theft 
because it would decrease the expected value a thief gets 
from stealing while presenting fewer points of confusion 
                                                 
66 Id. (quoting Kevin Mahaffey, Chief Technology Officer, 
Lookout (a maker of anti-theft smartphone apps,) “That seems 
like something that is reachable[]”).     
67 BYOD Requires Mobile Device Management, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(May 5, 2011, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/byod-requires-
mobile-device-management/d/d-id/1097576?.   
68 DEBORAH MORLEY, CHARLES PARKER & JANET LAVINE, 
UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS : TODAY AND TOMORROW 597 
(2004). 
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to consumers and fewer available black market 
workarounds to thieves, fly-by-night operations, or crime 
syndicates.  However, even assuming that a mandatory 
switch could be implemented without technical difficulties 
or hacking susceptibility, it may fail to deter thieves for a 
number of reasons.  At the same time, mandating kill 
switches may help correct, for consumer security, apathy 
that indirectly encourages theft.  Without more 
information about theft incentives and characteristics, the 
effects of a kill switch cannot be predicted for certain.  
A. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION REQUIRES 
MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND MAY MISINTERPRET 
THIEVING BEHAVIOR 
 The premise that putting kill switches in every 
phone will stop thieves from stealing phones relies upon a 
number of assumptions, including that: (1) thieves 
specifically target phones; (2) thieves target phones for 
their operability and will actually learn of kill switches; 
and (3) thieves cannot benefit from workarounds, such as 
hacks, which may pop up from time to time.  Because of 
legislative requirements, any kill switch underpinning 
these assumptions must also be costless to consumers, 
leading to another constraint on likely effectiveness since 
more expensive and potentially more effective solutions 
are foreclosed.  
1. THIEVES MAY NOT SPECIFICALLY TARGET PHONES 
TO STEAL 
 First, the increasing incidence of smartphone theft 
may belie the conclusion that thieves are specifically 
seeking to steal smartphones.  While smartphone theft 
nearly doubled last year, most of the growth came from 
large urban areas.69  It is entirely possible that spikes in 
                                                 
69 Samantha Murphy Kelly, What’s the Worst U.S. City for 
Smartphone Theft?, Mashable (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://mashable.com/2012/11/08/smartphone-theft-city/ 
(noting that the top ten locations for smartphone theft are 
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smartphone theft simply reflects the fact that more theft 
victims carry visible smartphones in their bags or on their 
person, or that smartphone owners have become less 
protective of their phones as they take them all over town.   
 The former point may have some statistically 
significant effect, as smartphone ownership has increased 
from 45% of Americans in 2012 to 58% by the end of 
2013.70  Part of this may also have to do with the fact that 
phones are getting bigger (and thus more apparent to 
would-be-thief passersby): global shipments of 
smartphones with screens over 5 inches more than 
doubled from 25.6 million in 2012 to 60.4 million in 2013.71 
 The latter point is also somewhat reflected in the 
available data: according to a recent survey by the mobile 
security firm Lookout, 44% of phones are stolen because 
they are left behind in a public setting.72  Though it may be 
possible that thieves are purposefully staking out public 
places like restaurants, clubs, or workplaces (the three 
most common places for phone theft to occur),73 much of 
the rise in theft may simply be attributable to growing 
owner forgetfulness that comes along with increased 
smartphone usage in public.  The fact that the average 
victim takes an entire hour to realize a theft74 probably 
indicates that most stolen phones are not quickly swiped 
                                                                                                 
Philadelphia, Seattle, Oakland, Long Beach, Newark, Detroit, 
Cleveland, Baltimore, New York, and Boston); Phone Theft in 
America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014), 
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phone-theft-in-
america (noting that 55% of thefts occur in urban areas). 
70 Device Ownership over Time, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT 
(accessed June 2, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/data-
trend/mobile/device-ownership/.  
71 Global Shipment of Smartphones with a Screen Size of 5 Inches or 
Larger, STATISTA (accessed June 2, 2014), 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/253350/shipments-of-
smartphones-with-screen-size-5-inches-or-larger/.  
72 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 
2014), https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phone-
theft-in-america. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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from right under the owner’s nose.  More likely, a 
restaurant or club patron leaves her phone on a table and 
another patron (or an employee) snatches it after the 
owner has left.  If these circumstances are more likely to 
occur than specific targeting by thieves, then kill switches 
may not have their intended deterrent effect since many 
thieves seem to not calculate the risks of a theft ahead of 
time. 
2. THIEVES MAY NOT LEARN ABOUT KILL SWITCHES 
OR EVEN CARE ABOUT STOLEN PHONE 
OPERABILITY 
 Even assuming that thieves engage in a risk 
calculus before attempting a theft, they may ignore the 
presence of a kill switch because they either do not know it 
exists or they do not care.  It is often so easy to steal a 
smartphone that a thief may not mind the probability that 
he will be stuck with a bricked device.  Thieves’ 
opportunism not only takes advantage of the fact that 
“people on phones can be so oblivious to surroundings 
they are not aware of a potential thief”75 but also of the 44 
% of thefts that occur when phones are left behind in 
public settings.  In these cases, taking a kill-switch-enabled 
phone presents little risk if the thief avoids getting caught, 
which most often is independent of the presence of a kill 
switch. If the phone is disabled, thieves may simply 
discard it and seek to steal another one. 
Thieves also have another option. An inoperative 
smartphone can still retain some resale value, even if only 
for parts.  Smartphone OS consultants and developers 
have suggested that components like the camera or the 
screen could fetch a price making it worthwhile to steal, 
while a thief could even damage a stolen smartphone and 
then claim the lower price that gadget recycling sites pay 
for broken hardware. 
Would publicity about the mandatory deployment 
of kill switches in smartphones create a powerful enough 
deterrent for thieves? That depends on a number of 
                                                 
75 Pegoraro, supra note 32 (internal citations omitted). 
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factors, such as (1) whether thieves would find out about 
kill switches personally, or through their fences; (2) how 
long would it take for theft to decrease once kill switches 
are deployed, which in turns depends on how long older 
versions of smartphones and OSs remain in use with 
consumers after the July 1, 2015 deadline; and (3) what 
thieves are stealing smartphones for.  
The first factor above is at the center of a debate 
between state legislators trying to enact kill switch bills 
and manufacturers of security systems. While legislators 
want to publicize the deployment of kill switches to deter 
theft, security companies such as Absolute (the creator of 
the LoJack)76 want unwitting thieves to continue 
connecting to the internet and cellular towers so that the 
company may track the thieves and gain remote access to 
stolen smartphones. 
The third factor above is related to whether 
smartphone theft is targeted more at sensitive data than at 
the hardware itself. While a stolen smartphone may fetch a 
thief a few hundred dollars, access to financial apps, even 
for a short period of time, may be far more valuable.  
What thieves are targeting ties into kill switch 
technical design choices as well.  A software kill switch 
could protect a phone from getting wiped and reset, but it 
would not protect sensitive data encrypted on the 
smartphone. A hardware kill switch would be more 
secure, as described in Part V. However, while it would 
protect encrypted personal data, it could make it possible 
for thieves to reactivate the phone for resale. “We need to 
understand what the motivation is in the theft before 
instilling a solution,” says Greg Kazmierczak, CTO of 
Wave Systems, a provider of hardware-based encryption 
technology, “What’s the most valuable component — the 
hardware or the data you are storing in your device?”77 
                                                 
76 Absolute, supra note 44. 
77 Jane Porter, Is a Mandatory Kill Switch the Solution to Smartphone 
Theft?, FORTUNE (May 27, 2014, 7:26 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/05/27/is-a-mandatory-kill-switch-
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3. THIEVES MAY TRUST THE BLACK MARKET TO END-
RUN AROUND THE KILL SWITCH 
 Thieves, even if they learn of and care about the 
effectiveness of kill switches, may still steal because they 
have access to workarounds or are willing to wait for 
them.  In Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the Metro 
transit system, Dan Stessel, pointed out that some stolen 
smartphones could be resold through buy-back programs 
like ecoATM kiosks that do not require face-to-face 
transactions.78  ecoATM responded with a statement: “Our 
policy is not to knowingly purchase phones with Find My 
iPhone activated, and we continue to improve our 
technology to that end.”79   
Even if no mechanism for resale is available at the 
time of theft, thieves may still impute some expected value 
from the stolen phone by sitting and waiting for a hack or 
new distribution stream.  This is precisely what happened 
with the doulCi hack mentioned above in Part V(B), where 
pictures of groups of newly jailbroken iPhones appeared 
on social media the day the hack was publicized.  The 
hackers posted server data corroborating claims that 
“more than 5,700 devices [were hacked] in just five 
minutes.”80  Precedents like these encourage thieves that 
“brickable” phones may still be worth stealing, so long as 
waiting for a value-adding hack to come along is possible.  
The assumptions in this section highlight the uncertain 
effect a kill switch may have at deterring theft, if it even 
has an effect at all. 
B. WHAT MINIMUM LEVEL OF KILL SWITCH 
TECHNOLOGY WOULD SUFFICIENTLY DETER THEFT? 
As discussed in Part V, a kill switch would be less 
vulnerable to hacking or jailbreaking, as its level of 
implementation gets lower. For higher levels of 
implementation in software, a thief could jailbreak the 
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smartphone (done today for security apps installed on top 
of the OS), replace the OS, edit the BIOS file, or wipe the 
IMEI number (listed with increasing levels of difficulty 
and therefore increasing levels of deterrence to theft). To 
be more secure, a kill switch should be implemented at a 
lower level or directly in hardware. However, the lower 
the level of implementation and more secure the kill 
switch, the more expensive it will be to design and 
implement for manufacturers. 
1. IN SEARCH OF AN OPTIMAL KILL SWITCH SOLUTION 
Designing the best kill switch is an optimization 
problem: what is the minimum level of kill switch 
technology needed that will prove enough of a deterrence 
to a thief?  The most expensive military-style solutions 
may not be needed as long as there is a sufficient 
deterrence to reduce theft by a desired amount.  As with 
most optimization problems, an optimal solution would 
depend on the value of the inputs and ensuring the correct 
inputs have been chosen.  It is hard to predict what factors 
of a kill switch would be optimal.  In Figure 1, we illustrate 
an example graphical representation of theft deterrence 
versus kill switch technology, showing how the cost of a 
kill switch and the cost of cracking it could lead to an 
optimal solution. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the potential relationship 
between kill switch technology and levels of theft 
deterrence. 
Making no special effort has little to no theft 
deterrence. Multiple carrier registries for difference 
carriers and different wireless standards (CDMA, GSM, 
and LTE) that carriers must only voluntarily consult 
provides a slightly higher level of deterrence. Using a 
single, shared carrier registry that carriers may be required 
to use to block stolen IMEI numbers by law, as in the case 
of Australia’s EMTA, provides an even higher level of theft 
deterrence. Mandating the most secure (and expensive) 
military-style solution, such as the Boeing black phone, 
may provide the maximum possible level of theft 
deterrence.  However, the expense of implementing it may 
not be commercially feasible: a cheaper hardware 
implementation alternative may be provide nearly as 
much deterrence at a far-reduced cost.  The optimal 
solution may be a mixed software/hardware 
implementation at the knee of the curve that provides a 
high level amount of theft deterrence at a cheaper cost. 
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2. A SIMPLISTIC MODEL OF THEFT BEHAVIOR 
An empirical study on theft deterrence versus kill 
switch technologies that takes into account factors such as 
the notice of a kill switch to thieves, the amount of 
implementation cost that industry is willing to absorb if 
mandated by law, and the cost of jailbreaking each level of 
kill switch technology would be useful to flesh out what an 
optimal solution may look like. Finally, a study on 
whether smartphone thieves are rational actors would be 
useful.  This is because models such as the one illustrated 
above operate on a number of assumptions that may be 
incorrect.  The following simplified model of thieving 
behavior demonstrates that—assuming thieves are rational 
actors—much is unknown about why thefts occur.  If a kill 
switch solution misunderstands the reason for theft, it may 
prove costly and ineffective. For example, a thief’s decision 
in deciding to steal a smartphone can be represented by 
the following equation.  Steal if:  U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] > 𝑈𝑈[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|], 
where U represents utility, E(phone) represents the 
expected value of the stolen smartphone, and E(caught) 
represents the expected value of getting caught. 
U[E(phone)] may be calculated as follows.  U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = {[1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ) −  𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗  𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)]}+ {[𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ) −  𝑝𝑝 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗  𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)]} +  𝛽𝛽, 
where 𝛽𝛽 represents any extraneous positive or negative 
utility (over the sale value) that a thief gets from 
successfully stealing and selling a phone. Further, 
U[|E(caught)|] may be calculated as follows. U[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|] = 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) =  𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ∗ |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| 
 If we assume a 15% catch rate of thieves and a 75% 
probability of a thief evading capture and encountering an 
unbreakable kill switch, we have the following incentive 
structure: U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (.1)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] + 
(.6)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)] + 𝛽𝛽. 
To continue working through the simplified model, 
assume a thief can net $200 profit on average for fencing a 
jailbroken phone and a $100 profit on average from either 
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selling the parts on a kill-switch-enabled phone or (if 
available) paying a hacker to bypass the kill switch.  A 
thief can expect: U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = 80 +  𝛽𝛽; 
Steal if : 80 +  𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) 
 A rational thief will therefore steal the phone so 
long as the expected value of stealing a phone (here, 80 + 𝛽𝛽) exceeds the expected value loss from being caught.  
Assuming that 𝛽𝛽 is nominal and the probability of being 
caught remains 15%, a rational thief will steal a phone 
unless his expected value loss from being caught is greater 
than roughly $533: (. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 80,  
𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 533  
 To take it a step further, even assuming that a thief 
has a 100% chance of either being caught or encountering a 
kill switch (say, 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) = .15 and 
𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐ℎ) = .85), the thief may still gain 
utility from selling the parts or awaiting a hack to bypass 
the switch: U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (0)* 200 + (.7)* 100 + 𝛽𝛽 = 70 + 𝛽𝛽; 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝: 70 +  𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡); (. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 70,  
𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 467  
Thus, a rational thief who fully comprehends the 
existence and effect of a kill switch ubiquitous on all 
phones could still decide to steal a phone, if only to make a 
profit off of selling hardware or data on the black market. 
Clearly, this exercise does not purport to represent 
the reality of thieving behavior, but rather to show how 
difficult it is to understand the rationale behind stealing a 
phone.  An endless number of additional assumptions can 
be introduced to the model (such as a negative effect on 
utility when encountering a kill-switch-enabled phone to 
represent confusion), and the model still remains a gross 
oversimplification of reality.  The core assumption that 
thieves are rational actors is also incredibly dubious.  Most 
phone thieves probably won’t bother to calculate a 
detailed incentives equation like the one above, and thus 
they may not respond well to changing incentives (like the 
introduction of kill switches). 
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C. COULD VIGILANTISM HURT THE KILL SWITCH’S 
SAFETY OBJECTIVE? 
The stated objective of both the SOS initiative and 
the various kill switch bills in state legislatures is to 
increase consumer safety by preventing (violent) theft.  
However, only 11% of smartphone theft involves a robber 
taking a smartphone from a person.81  Moreover, 68% of 
theft victims reported a willingness to resort to vigilantism 
to recover their smartphones.82  New apps such as Find 
My iPhone offer GPS tracking capabilities for those 
desperate to recover their smartphones, stirring worries 
among law enforcement officials that people are putting 
themselves and others in danger.83  “Some have been 
successful,” said George Gascón, the San Francisco district 
attorney and a former police chief, “others have gotten 
hurt.”84 
Pursuing a thief can lead to violence, especially 
when people arm themselves—hammers are popular—
while hunting for stolen smartphones.  A New Jersey man 
was arrested after he tracked his stolen smartphone and 
ended up attacking the wrong man, mistaking him for the 
thief.85   
A kill switch could lead to increased violence in 
three ways.  First, the way in which it is implemented 
could make it easier to track a stolen smartphone and take 
the law into one’s own hands.  Second, a thief who knows 
that an owner can brick a stolen smartphone may violently 
attack the owner during the robbery to prevent the owner 
from recovering and “bricking” the stolen smartphone too 
                                                 
81 LOOKOUT, supra note5. 
82 Id. 
83 Ian Lovett, When Hitting ‘Find My iPhone’ Takes You to a Thief’s 
Doorstep, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/us/when-hitting-find-
my-iphone-takes-you-to-a-thiefs-doorstep.html. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
62                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
soon.  Third, if the “bricked” smartphone displays the 
owner’s address, as some security apps and MDM 
solutions do, that could invite retribution from a frustrated 
thief.86  Further investigation of whether a kill switch 
implementation would increase vigilantism and violence 
above the level already occurring with apps such as Find 
My iPhone is critical before defining a kill switch standard 
and settling on a particular implementation. 
However, vigilantism is also fueled by the 
dismissive responses that victims of theft receive from 
manufacturers and service carriers.  For example, a victim 
who tracked his stolen smartphone to a particular house 
and called AT&T was given two options by the carrier: 
either deactivate the phone and buy a new one, or find a 
cop willing to subpoena AT&T for information, file a 
lengthy police report, and go through a long bureaucratic 
process.87  Manufacturers and carriers have little incentive 
to help a victim recover a device because the manufacturer 
profits by hawking a replacement phone; and the carrier 
profits by locking the crime victim into a new contract, 
then opening an account with whomever ends up with the 
stolen phone.88  Carriers even profit from the specter of 
phone theft, by selling expensive insurance policies to 
protect their users.  A mandatory kill switch could reverse 
this trend and potentially reverse the need for vigilantism 
by turning stolen smartphones worthless or promoting 
their recovery. 
D. EXEMPT DEVICES COULD REDUCE THEFT 
DETERRENCE 
As we describe in Part V, the millions of older 
versions of smartphones still in use by the deployment 
deadline would defeat the theft deterrence objective of the 
kill switch legislation by around two years.  In addition, 
the presence of other exempt devices would also drag the 
level of deterrence downward.  For example, the California 
                                                 
86 MORLEY, supra note 68. 
87 Swan, supra note 17.  
88 Id. 
COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?              63 
 
Senate Energy, Utilities, and Communication Committee 
listed the following exempt devices that would not be 
required to have a kill switch.   
 
All devices that fall within the exception for 
resale and pawnbrokers; All devices sold 
out of state and brought into California; All 
devices currently in the market, which 
customers typically replace every 18 to 24 
months; All devices provided “free” as part 
of a promotion or a wireless lifeline plan; 
and All devices that, even if rendered 
inoperable by a kill switch, may have value 
for parts.89   
 
Such devices would continue to have value for resale on 
the black market. Moreover, the potentially large number 
of such devices in use would incentivize thieves to take 
their chances with a kill switch and continue with 
smartphone theft. 
E. The Power of Default 
The various pieces of legislation mandating a kill 
switch for smartphones have provisions stating that each 
smartphone sold must have the kill switch enabled but 
that consumers should have the ability to disable the kill 
switch upon purchase.  On the other hand, the CTIA and 
third-party security app vendors such as Absolute would 
prefer that any kill switch be deployed on an opt-in basis, 
with consumers choosing whether to opt in to the 
program.  While an opt-in program puts consumer choice 
front and center in deciding how a kill switch would be 
deployed, the choice of whether a kill switch program is 
                                                 
89 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications 
Committee, March 24, 2014, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml? 
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis 
tab, then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And 
Communications”). 
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opt-in or opt-out will have a significant impact of whether 
kill switches will be adopted  by the majority of 
smartphone owners.  
The choice of the default position is based on three 
assumptions from behavioral economics.  First, more 
consumers stay with the default than would choose to do 
so if forced to choose.90  Second, only consumers who 
prefer the opt-out choice will opt out.  And third, where 
carriers oppose the default position, they will be forced to 
explain it to smartphone owners, resulting in well-
informed decisions by consumers.  However, Professor 
Willis asserts, in the privacy context, that these 
assumptions are unlikely to hold.  
The default position, such as an opt-in kill switch, 
favored by companies is often surrounded by a powerful 
campaign to keep consumers there, but a default position 
set contrary to company interests can be met with an 
equally powerful campaign to drive consumers out.91  
Therefore, companies can either bolster the mechanisms 
behind the inertia that leads consumers to stick with 
defaults or they can weaken them to induce consumers to 
opt out.  Rather than forcing companies to facilitate 
consumer exercise of informed choice, many defaults leave 
companies with opportunities to play on consumer biases 
or confuse consumers into sticking with or opting out of 
the default.92  However, to really deter theft, smartphones 
will require near–100 % adoption, such that thieves stop 
taking the chance that a given smartphone will have the 
kill switch disabled. 
F. TRACKING LOCAL SMARTPHONE SALES AND 
INCREASED PENALTIES FOR IMEI WIPING 
In 2013, New York State Senate Co-Leader Jeffrey 
Klein and Assemblyman Jeff Dinowitz, Chair of the 
Assembly’s Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee, 
                                                 
90 Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default?, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 61 (forthcoming 2014). 
91 Id. 
92 Id.. 
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introduced new legislation to require smartphone sellers to 
prove that they are the rightful owners of the phones they 
sell.93  The objective of the legislation is to curtail the local 
black market for stolen smartphones.  Non-compliant 
sellers face the possibility of steep fines or jail time.94  The 
state lawmakers hope that this legislation would stop 
stolen smartphones being sold at neighborhood stores, 
laundromats, and flea market stands. 
The legislation would require smartphone sellers to 
provide detailed receipts for every phone sold, including 
the IMEI number.  It is hoped that these records could 
provide additional information on how and where stolen 
phones move in the marketplace.  However, Arieanna 
Schweber of Absolute Software claims that although the 
bill could make the sale of stolen mobile phones locally 
more difficult, it will not diminish the demand for stolen 
devices.95  This is because the majority of stolen 
smartphones are now being shipped abroad.  Therefore, 
local legislation will likely be inadequate to address the 
global issue. 
Also in 2013, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer 
reintroduced legislation that would make it a federal crime 
to wipe an IMEI number by imposing a five-year criminal 
penalty.96  Senator Schumer noted that without a criminal 
penalty for tampering with IMEI numbers, thieves could 
simply alter the IMEI number to evade carrier registries 
and reactivate a smartphone phone.  Because the bill has 
the full support of the CTIA and the FCC, it could prevent 
reactivation of stolen smartphones.  However, it may have 
little deterrence value if smartphones are primarily being 
stolen for an international black market. 
                                                 
93  S. 5976, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).  
94 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22761(c) (West 2014) (“The 
knowing retail sale of a smartphone in California . . . may be 
subject to a civil penalty”).  
95 Arieanna Schweber, New York Legislators Propose Law to Reduce 
Black Market for Mobile Devices,  INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://theft319.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=16105444&item=
24. 
96 S. 1070, 112th Cong. (2013). 
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VII. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS AND PRACTICAL 
DIFFICULTIES OF A MANDATORY KILL SWITCH 
A government-mandated kill switch, as opposed to 
allowing individuals to make their own security choices, 
raises several additional concerns and risks of misuse and 
surveillance. 
A. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL 
Although Internet companies and government 
agencies already track bulk and targeted data on the 
Internet, individuals today have the ability to erase and 
block tracking cookies, prevent the transmission of 
specified local data, and even use encryption technology, 
given enough technical savvy.97  However, mandatory 
phone kill switches have the potential to significantly 
increase government surveillance and control over speech 
and political behavior. On August 11, 2011, the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit system (BART) shut down cellphone service 
to four stations in San Francisco in response to a planned 
protest, because in July 2011 protesters disrupted BART 
service in response to the fatal shooting of a passenger by 
BART police.98 BART first approached carriers directly and 
asked them to turn off service.  Later, a BART officer 
asserted that “BART staff or contractors shut down power 
to the nodes and alerted the cell carriers” after the fact.99  A 
smartphone kill switch that the government can control by 
exerting authority over carriers could even more greatly 
empower the government to squelch political protests by 
disrupting smartphone service and making organization 
                                                 
97 Thomas Claburn, Kill Switches: Phones Just the Start, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobile-
devices/kill-switches-phones-just-the-start/d/d-id/1113887.  
98 Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 12, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubarak-
san-francisco. 
99 Id. (quoting James Allison, deputy chief communications 
officer for BART). 
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and coordination of citizen movements or protests 
difficult.  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) compared 
BART’s actions with those of former President Hosni 
Mubarak of Egypt who ordered the shutdown of cellphone 
service in Tahrir Square in response to peaceful, 
democratic protests in 2011.100  Moreover, British Prime 
Minister David Cameron is considering new, broad 
censorship powers over social networks, such as Facebook 
and Twitter and mobile communication in the UK.101  The 
ability to peremptorily control smartphone kill switches 
could have grave concerns for free speech and democracy.  
However, BART was able to shut down cellphones 
without a kill switch.  Therefore, whether kill switches 
really represent a broad enlargement of the government’s 
power requires information on how much a kill switch 
would add to the government’s current ability to turn off 
smartphone communications.  The advantage of a kill 
switch that the government has the ability to control is that 
it could prevent theft of trade secrets and national secrets 
from stolen smartphones.  Further study would be 
welcome on how this would work with or without the 
consent of the smartphone’s owner.  
B. INSECURE NON-OWNER CONTROL 
As the CTIA points out, even if a kill switch is 
technologically feasible, it could have serious risks.  If a 
mandatory kill switch is created, every smartphone would 
have the capability. Depending on the implementation, the 
“kill” message could be known to every operator and 
could not be kept secret.102  A private party with malicious 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 James Kirkup, UK Riots: Tougher Powers Could Curb Twitter, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697142/U
K-riots-tougher-powers-could-curb-Twitter.html. 
102 CTIA, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the Answer, 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer
.pdf. 
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intent could therefore replicate the “kill” message, such as 
a text or other message sent to the smartphone to disable 
it.  In another scenario, if “killing” a smartphone requires a 
call to the carrier, that call could be placed by an identity 
theft who does not possess the smartphone or an abusive 
spouse who actually owns the family account to which his 
wife’s smartphone is tied.  Where a smartphone is disabled 
by the malicious use of a “kill switch,” the safety of the 
user may be jeopardized, as in the abusive spouse 
scenario, because the wife will be unable to make 
emergency calls. 
By sending multiple messages, such as by 
incrementing the telephone number or IMEI number, 
groups of smartphones could be disabled.  This could be 
used to disable entire groups of customers, such as the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland 
Security or emergency services and law enforcement.103  If 
the kill switch is a permanent switch, a smartphone could 
be disabled forever.  The risk of denial of service could be 
far too large. Therefore, the carrier community maintains 
that control of operation (and denial of service) be 
embedded in the network and not at the smartphone-
level.104 
 
C. FARADAY BAG WORKAROUNDS 
 
Driven by high prices for non-contract 
smartphones overseas, the underground trade of stolen 
smartphones has now become a global enterprise that 
connects violent street thieves in American cities with 
buyers as far away as Hong Kong, according to law 
enforcement and the wireless industry.  Jerry Deaven, an 
agent with the Department of Homeland Security, which is 
tasked with preventing the trafficking of stolen goods, told 
The Huffington Post that traffickers are responsible for “a 
tremendous amount of phones being shipped out of the 
country,” adding that “some organizations are shipping a 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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couple million dollars worth of phones per month.”105  
Some stolen smartphones are placed into Faraday Bags 
immediately after being stolen to block GPS tracking.  
Further study is required on whether a Faraday Bag could 
be used to circumvent a kill switch, and, if so, whether a 
smartphone stolen in the U.S. could then be activated 
abroad.  How about a stolen smartphone with a “kill 
switch” taken from California in a Faraday Bag to Arizona 
or Nevada, states without corresponding kill switch 
legislation.  Ultimately the answers to these questions will 
help determine whether a kill switch would be a better 
solution than carrier registries, and, if so, help drive the 
design of an optimal kill switch.  
D. MINIMIZING THE BURDEN ON SMARTPHONE 
OWNERS 
 Finally, the amount of user effort needed to deal 
with kill switch systems, including notifying carriers in the 
event of theft or loss, reversing the data wipe and "un-
bricking" a smartphone after recovery, or heading off the 
kill command in the event a misplaced smartphone is 
found, should not burden smartphone owners in the same 
way passwords do.  For example, computer users today 
are required or strongly encouraged to employ different, 
long, and complicated passwords on each of multiple 
devices: laptops, tablets, desktops; and multiple accounts: 
financial websites, health websites, company logins, 
Google, etc.106  
 The Office of California Attorney General Kamala 
Harris advises users and businesses on computer security, 
                                                 
105 Gerry Smith, Inside the Massive Global Black Market for 
Smartphones, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2013, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/smartphone-
black-market_n_3510341.html?utm_hp_ref=iphone-theft. 
106 Chenda Ngak, The 25 Most Common Passwords of 2013, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-25-most-common-
passwords-of-2013 (“[T]he top three passwords of [2013] are 
‘123456,’ ‘password’ and ‘12345678’.”). 
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including using firewalls, anti-virus software, and complex 
passwords.107 However, passwords have done little to 
prevent hacking of sensitive information and cyber-
attacks.  California businesses and the government have 
experienced 300 separate data breaches exposing the 
personal information of more than 20 million customer 
accounts during the past two years.108  Complex password 
requirements therefore simply burden users without 
actually preventing hacking.  Any proposed kill switch 
technology and carrier response protocols should be 
designed to minimize the burden on users while 
burdening smartphone thieves instead.  A study on the 
lessons the industry or analysts have learned from the 
failed decades-long password experiment would be useful 
to prevent repeating this costly mistake on smartphone kill 
switches. 
VIII. EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE 
APPROACHES: PATCHWORK REGULATION IN A 
NATIONAL / INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 
 The decentralized nature of the mandatory kill 
switch movement presents a host of concerns for proper 
implementation of an effective and democratic solution.  
The practical reality of state-by-state piecemeal legislation 
is that the bigger, more influential states tend to drive 
policy.  Thus, while Minnesota has passed its kill switch 
legislation and gained a first mover’s advantage, 
pragmatically the bill only applies to phones sold or 
purchased new in Minnesota.  This is not to say that 
threats of foreclosing a state market will have no effect on 
phone providers—risking infringement of the Minnesota 
                                                 
107 State of California, Office of the Attorney General, Is Your 
Computer Secure?, http://oag.ca.gov/privacy/facts/online-
privacy/computer-secure. 
108 Don Thompson, California to Step Up Cybersecurity Efforts 
After Hundreds of DatauBreaches, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 
(Feb. 27, 2014, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_25240431/californi
a-step-up-cybersecurity-efforts-after-hundreds-data. 
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bill may encourage all phone manufacturers and carriers to 
comply with the kill switch mandate.  However, 
patchwork state mandates of kill switches may do little to 
deter thieves, particularly where there is doubt over where 
the phone was bought.   
 The real test of the legislation’s viability (and the 
site of potential legal challenges) however arises in the 
larger states where more phones are sold.  Hence, 
California and New York are the likely battlegrounds for 
policy development and industry regulation.  Because 
roughly one-eighth of all Americans live in California, and 
Apple and Google are based there, the California law may 
very well produce an immediate national default.109 
 This potential California effect risks legislating 
national policy at the state level and may very well 
overstep the ability of other democratically elected leaders 
to have a say in how kill switches should be adopted, if 
they should at all.  The CTIA claims, for instance, that the 
Minnesota bill creates interstate commerce concerns 
“because it heavily burdens the national wireless device 
and service market by dictating operational and technical 
specifications of mobile devices.”110  At the same time, 
coordinating state legislation is potentially challenging, 
unnecessary, and time-consuming.  According to the 
Secure Our Smartphones initiative, twenty-three state 
Attorneys General support the proposal, among many 
                                                 
109 Wagenseil, supra note 16.  See also Elizabeth Weise, Google, 
Microsoft to add “kill switches” to phones, USA Today (June 20, 
2014, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/20/google-
microsoft-kill-switches/11083511/.  
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other district attorneys and other state political figures.111  
Many of these states whose attorneys general support a 
mandatory kill switch may simply prefer to conserve 
political resources and allow other states, like California, to 
drive the policy.  Kill switch opponents, however, will 
then likely argue that such a proposal has no opportunity 
to be debated by democratically elected state 
representatives, who may have valuable input on the 
matter.  In truth, kill switch bills are not passing 
legislatures easily.  There are only five state bills and one 
federal bill passed or pending, and California’s version 
was rejected once in the state senate before narrowly 
passing recently.112  The federal kill switch bill, which 
would pose fewer of the risks that accompany state 
piecemeal legislation, has experienced little movement 
since being announced in February 2014. 
 Technological mandates in general are difficult to 
accomplish successfully by government legislation, much 
less state-by-state legislation.  As the CTIA explains, there 
is little reason to “limit consumer choice by mandating the 
use of any solution . . . [because] [a]ny mandated 
technology standard will quickly become outdated in the 
fast-moving world of wireless applications and 
technology.”113  The private sector’s hesitance to accept 
government technology mandates is not unreasonable, 
particularly in a sector of rapid innovation like mobile 
phones.  Politicians, many of whom have little technical 
comprehension of the issue, are likely not the ideal 
decision-makers on how technology must be used. 
 Nonetheless, there is a fitting example of an 
effective technological mandate on a similar issue as the 
smartphone kill switch.  Car theft laws, passed in the 1980s 
and 1990s, successfully decreased auto theft by increasing 
                                                 
111 Secure Our Smartphone Initiative Members, Office of New 
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penalties for thieves and mandating implementation of 
anti-theft vehicle identification numbers on the engine, 
transmission, and other main body parts (which became 
illegal to remove).114  This movement, however, was aided 
in large part by federal legislation, namely the 1984 Motor 
Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act, which federally 
implemented the above, and the 1994 Motor Vehicle Theft 
Prevention Act, which mandated federal cooperation with 
states to create an opt-in program whereby volunteers 
would consent to law enforcement stopping the car if it 
were operated in certain conditions (such as late at 
night).115  Further, the anti-auto-theft movement had 
federal oversight of exported cars to check for owner 
vehicle identification numbers.116 
 Clearly, no such solution is viable for smartphones, 
which are smaller and harder to track.  While no 
authoritative data exists on this point, the international 
black market certainly provides an integral boon to 
smartphone theft.  Especially in countries where 
smartphones are not widely imported, stolen phones can 
sell for incredibly high amounts that only reinforce the 
motive to internationally traffic stolen phones.  In March 
2013, California charged two men with operating a stolen 
phone trafficking ring to Hong Kong from which they 
made over $4 million in a year.117  Another man being 
charged reportedly bought iPhones from people at coffee 
shops for $250 to $350 and trafficked them on his person to 
Vietnam, eleven at a time, making trips as often as he 
could, apparently making enough profit to justify the 
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trips.118  Anecdotes such as these highlight the limits with 
even a comprehensive federal regulation aimed at 
deterring smartphone theft.  A patchwork approach of kill 
switch mandates risks exploitation by both inter-state 
limitations and international black market workarounds.  
Mandatory kill switches, regardless of how effective they 
may seem, face many roadblocks to attaining their stated 
goal of deterring theft.  
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND A CONCISE LIST OF OPEN 
QUESTIONS 
As we have shown in this paper, the stakeholders 
in the kill switch debate, including legislators, smartphone 
manufacturers, and carriers are each operating on the basis 
of a large number of assumptions and unknowns, 
including the following: 
 
• What an optimal technical implementation of a kill 
switch at no additional cost to the consumer would 
be, including whether it should be implemented in 
software, hardware, or an automated form of the 
present manual IMEI blocking registries; 
• What role MDM solutions and carrier registries 
will play in or out of an environment in which kill 
switches are deployed; 
•  Whether the large increase in smartphone theft is 
because thieves are specially targeting smartphones 
or whether smartphone theft is only incidental or 
unrelated to typical robberies; 
• Whether an effective kill switch will actually deter 
theft or only incentivize them to ship more stolen 
smartphones to the international black market; and 
• Whether a kill switch presents concerns, such as 
government surveillance and malicious activation 
or circumvention. 
 
In addition to the assumptions and unknowns 
above, there are significant practical concerns about 
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actually implementing a kill switch at no cost to the 
consumer across varying industry smartphone platforms 
and operating systems by the legislation’s deadline of July 
1, 2015.  A necessary first step to such an implementation 
would be for the wireless industry to properly define kill 
switch standards so each manufacturer could conform 
their hardware, operating systems, and design platform 
accordingly. The short runway presented by the state bills 
allows very little time for such standard-setting activity.  
Requiring a solution too soon may not consider the 
balance between (1) the nature, urgency and magnitude of 
the problem, and (2) the cost, harm to innovation, and 
burden on the wireless industry of any mandated change. 
For example, in discussing the possibility of adding a theft-
resistant “kill switch” to future iPhone models, Apple 
noted that the next two generations of the iPhone have 
already been developed, and were designed before Steve 
Jobs’s death in late 2011.119  Therefore, the challenges of 
effectively implementing a technological mandate too 
quickly could be a significant burden on smartphone 
manufacturers to modify their planned pipeline of designs. 
Developing sound policy to deter smartphone theft 
would therefore benefit from more in-depth investigation 
of smartphone theft psychology, the mechanics of the 
black market for smartphones, the merits of technological 
solutions, and how to most effectively implement an 
overall solution.  The time for such investigation is now, as 
the landmark California legislation’s mandate goes into 
effect on July 1, 2015. 
 
APPENDIX: SELECTED TEXT OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
 There are four state bills and one federal bill 
demanding mandatory kill switches: California S.B. 962; 
Minnesota H.B. 1952; Illinois S.B. 3539; New York A.B. 
8984; and the federal Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, 
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H.R. 4065.  Minnesota’s bill was signed into law on May 
14, 2014, while California’s bill passed the state senate on 
May 8, 2014 and became law on August 25, 2014.  What 
follows is a brief description of key text from the bills. 
 California legislation S.B. 962 applies to 
smartphones manufactured and sold in California on or 
after July 1, 2015.  It requires these smartphones to 
“[i]nclude a technological solution . . . [that] can render the 
essential features of the smartphone inoperable to an 
unauthorized user” (emphasis added).  This technological 
solution “may consist of software, hardware, or a 
combination of both software and hardware.”  Here are 
some selected quotes from the bill, with underlines of key 
phrases:  
 
• “The technological solution should be able to 
withstand a hard reset or operating system 
downgrade, come preequipped, and the default 
setting of the solution shall be to prompt the 
consumer to enable the solution during the 
initial device setup.” 
• “‘Essential features’ of a smartphone are the 
ability to use the device for voice 
communications, text messaging, and browse 
the Internet, including the ability to access and 
use mobile software applications.” 
• “The technological solution shall be reversible, 
so that if the rightful owner obtains possession 
of the device after the essential features of the 
smartphone have been rendered inoperable, the 
operation of those essential features can be 
restored by an authorized user.” 
•  “An authorized user of a smartphone may 
affirmatively elect to disable or opt-out of 
enabling the technological solution at any 
time.” 
• “In order to be effective, antitheft technological 
solutions need to be ubiquitous, as thieves 
cannot distinguish between those smartphones 
that have the solutions enabled and those that 
do not.” 
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• “The Legislature finds and declares that the 
enactment of a uniform policy to deter thefts of 
smartphones and to protect the privacy of 
smartphone users if their smartphones are 
involuntarily acquired by others is a matter of 
statewide concern.” 
  
 Minnesota H.B. 1952, now passed as law, becomes 
effective on July 1, 2015 on all smartphones sold or 
purchased new in Minnesota.  It provides that these 
smartphones “must be equipped with technology 
designed to render the device inoperable in the event of 
theft or loss.”  Here are some selected quotes from the bill: 
 
• “Smart phone does not include an electronic 
reader, tablet, or other similar device not 
primarily intended for two-way voice 
communication.” 
• “[Must] be reversible in the event of the smart 
phone’s recovery by its owner” 
• “Lock all of the smart phone’s user data, and 
ensure that it is only accessible to the user or a 
law enforcement officer subject to a valid search 
warrant” 
• “Render the smart phone core functionality 
inoperable on any wireless telecommunications 
service provider’s network globally” 
• “Prevent the smart phone from being 
reactivated without a passcode or other similar 
authorization, even if the device is 
reprogrammed, is turned off and subsequently 
turned back on, has its network connectivity 
disabled and subsequently re-enabled, or has 
its SIM card removed” 
 
 New York’s proposed A.B. 8984 (which did not 
make it out of the legislative committee) would be 
applicable to any advanced mobile communications device 
sold in New York on or after July 1, 2015, with “advanced 
mobile communications device” defined very similarly to 
California’s definition with the exception of including 
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tablets.  A.B. 8984’s description of the kill switch 
functionality is also highly similar to California’s, and its 
legislative intent tracks the rationale of California as well.  
The following two quotes are also of note: 
 
• “It is the further intent of the legislature to 
prohibit any term or condition in a service 
contract between a customer and a commercial 
mobile radio service provider that requires or 
encourages the customer to disable the 
technological solution that renders the 
customer’s smartphone or other advanced 
communications device useless if stolen.” 
• “The rightful owner of an advanced mobile 
communications device may affirmatively elect 
to disable the technological solution after sale. 
However, the physical acts necessary to disable 
to the technological solution may only be 
performed by the end-use consumer or a 
person specifically selected by the end-use 
consumer to disable the technological solution 
and shall not be physically performed by any 
retail seller of the advanced mobile 
communications device.” 
 
 Illinois proposed S.B. 3539 (which did not make it 
out of the legislative committee) would apply immediately 
upon passage to any smartphones manufactured and sold 
in Illinois.  S.B. 3539 is similar to the other legislation, but 
uniquely would require all violating providers to insure 
the phones at no cost to the consumer, rather than levying 
a per-phone monetary penalty.  The following quotes are 
of note: 
 
• “‘Smartphone’ means a cellular phone that is 
built on a mobile operating system and 
possesses advanced computing capability. 
Features a smart phone may possess include, 
but are not limited to, built-in applications, 
Internet access, digital voice service, text 
messaging, e-mail, and Internet browsing.” 
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• “[P]ermanently remove all saved data on the 
device” 
• “[R]ender the smart phone completely 
inoperable on any wireless telephone service 
provider’s network, including a wireless 
telephone service provider’s global network” 
• “[P]revent the smart phone from being 
reactivated or reprogrammed without a 
password or other similar authorization” 
• “[D]isable the device even if it is turned off or 
the SIM card or other data storage medium is 
removed” 
• “[B]e reversible if the device is recovered by its 
owner.” 
 
 The federal proposed Smartphone Theft Prevention 
Act, H.R. 4065, would have applied beginning January 1, 
2015 on any mobile device manufactured in the U.S. or 
imported for sale to the public in the U.S. (it did not make 
it out of legislative committee).  It would have covered any 
“‘mobile device’ [which] means a personal electronic 
device on which commercial mobile service or commercial 
mobile data service is provided” and included an 
exemption for any technology that “accomplishes the 
functional equivalent of the function” defined in the bill as 
being able to remotely and costlessly:  
 
• “Delete or render inaccessible from the device 
all information relating to the account holder 
that has been placed on the device” 
• “Render the device inoperable on the network 
of any provider of commercial mobile service or 
commercial mobile data service globally, even 
if the device is turned off or has the data 
storage medium removed” 
• “Prevent the device from being reactivated or 
reprogrammed without a passcode or similar 
authorization after the device has been 
rendered inoperable or subject to an 
unauthorized factory reset” 
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• “[R]everse any action . . . if the device is 
recovered by the account holder.” 
 
 In response to these pieces of legislation, the CTIA 
has produced its own voluntary opt-in commitment for 
carriers and manufacturers.  The main provisions are as 
follows: 
 
• Remote wipe the authorized user’s data that is 
on the smartphone in the event it is lost or 
stolen. 
• Render the smartphone inoperable to an 
unauthorized user (e.g., locking the smartphone 
so it cannot be used without a password or 
PIN), except in accordance with FCC rules for 
911 emergency communications, and if 
available, emergency numbers programmed by 
the authorized user (e.g., “phone home”). 
• Prevent reactivation without authorized user’s 
permission (including unauthorized factory 
reset attempts) to the extent technologically 
feasible  
• Reverse the inoperability if the smartphone is 
recovered by the authorized user and restore 
user data on the smartphone to the extent 
feasible (e.g., restored from the cloud). 
